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Professor White tells the story of the development of tort
law - or rather, theorizing about tort law - through four
successive stages of thought he calls (i) Legal Science (or Con-
ceptualism), (2) Realism, (3) Consensus Thought, and (4) Neo-
conceptualism. His story begins around 1870, when legal ac-
ademics, inspired by a generally prevailing ideal of scientific
endeavor, tried to sort private law into systems of general
classification. What emerged from this process was the doc-
trinal field of torts, until then a heterogeneous jumble of mis-
cellaneous rights of action. In their passion for generalization,
legal scientists sought to reclassify as many of these actions as
possible under a single theory of liability, whose organizing
principle was fault. By the early years of the new century the
scientists had popularized among the bar the now familiar
organization of the field, into intentional torts, negligence, and
strict liability - though they thought the last anomalous and
kept trying to expel it. Soon, however, there arose a generation
of Realists (preceded by the transitional figure of Francis Boh-
len and typified by his opponent Leon Green), who, influenced
by the antiformalist and empiricist views of the philosophy
and social science of their age, sharply criticized the "princi-
ples" developed by legal science as excessively abstract: "neg-
ligence," for example, could only be given meaning by exam-
ining particular types of risk created by particular categories
of plaintiffs; "legal" or "proximate" cause was shown to require
the same kind of inquiry into the relation of the parties, and
the resolution of questions of negligence or causation came to
be seen as calling for judgments of policy, ascertaining the
"interests" of all the relevant parties and arriving at some
balance of them. After some skirmishes, the Realist view
generally triumphed by the 1930's, though the doctrinal cate-
gories of Science were retained as ways of organizing the field.
But the atomizing tendencies of Realism, its drive to reduce
I Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
2 Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. I would like to thank Henry Steiner
for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Review. A conversation with
Professor White improved the manuscript at several points, though of course he is
not to be taken as having approved its final form.
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legal rules to a rubble of disconnected particulars, set in motion
a yearning for intellectual equilibrium and repose. This mood
persisted through the 1940's and 195o's and was very creative
in a practical way, producing out of its confidence in "objec-
tivity and rationality" (p. 189) Prosser on Torts,3 Judge Tray-
nor's opinions on strict products liability, 4 and the second
Restatement.5 This "Consensus Thought," however, had
never really responded to the threat of Realism by formulating
a new structure for tort law; it had only stopped talking about
Realism. Consequently, that threat persisted into the late
I96o's and 1970's, when a diverse band of tort theorists (Pos-
ner, Epstein, Fletcher, Calabresi) responded by setting out to
restore to the field some general unifying conceptions. Now,
the rival theories of these Neoconceptualists struggle to dom-
inate the analysis of tort liability.
I.
If the story thus outlined sounds rather familiar, it's be-
cause it is: for law teachers at least, the experience of reading
this book will be like taking a bus tour through the city in
which they have lived their adult lives: "Now on your right
is the Palsgraf case, 6 a case you would hardly believe really
happened.... And if you look closely, you can see where
products liability began to emerge in Escola."' 7 The tourist
may wonder why the bus (the trip is billed as a tour of
intellectual landmarks) skips some of the most famous attrac-
tions, since it stops at length by Holmes, Bohlen, Leon Green,
Cardozo, Prosser, and Traynor but misses or slights Jeremiah
Smith, Pound, Wigmore, Seavey, Harper and James, Hart,
and Honor6, and even (most surprisingly) Learned Hand,
whose negligence "formula" 8 is indispensible to every torts
student. Where he does stop, White as tour guide provides
concise and useful accounts of the major changes in thought
summarized above; these are sometimes pedestrian but some-
3 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (ust ed. 1941).
4 See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (en banc); Trust v. Arden Farms Co., 50 Cal. 2d 217, 235, 324
P.2d 583, 594 (I958) (en banc) (Traynor, J., concurring and dissenting); Gordon v.
Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal. 2d 514, 523, 203 P.2d 522, 528 (1949) (en banc) (Traynor,
J., concurring in the judgment).
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).
6 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
7 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, I5O P.2d 436 (1944).
8 "[Ihf the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden B; liability
depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL."
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., i5g F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
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times insightful. Of particular interest is White's perceptive
discussion of the battle between Leon Green and Francis Boh-
len in the 192o's and 1930's (pp. 75-83), the confrontation of
mature Realism with an earlier form, modified Conceptualism.
Green and the true Realists, on one hand, and Bohlen and the
modified Conceptualists, on the other, shared a basic assump-
tion: policy is critical to the resolution of any legal question.
But, as White explains, they derived irreconcilable conclusions
that characterize the two strands of scholarship within the
Realist movement - Bohlen thought doctrinal rules could be
adapted to social change, but Green came to believe all rules
were myths.
II.
But White aspires to something more than a survey of
theories about tort law. The book's real claim to novelty is in
the way it explains why tort doctrine has taken the forms it
has; and it is that apparatus of explanation that I want to
discuss.
To begin with, White's version involves some important
deviations and omissions from the usual telling of the story.
Normally "social forces," vaguely conceived of as "industrial-
ization" or more concretely as "the railroads" or "the factory
system," play an important causal role. 9 In the benign version,
the spirit of the common law deploys the negligence principle
to protect infant American industry against costs that would
hamper its takeoff, but it repudiates negligence and turns to
promoting social welfare through strict liability when such
protection is no longer necessary for economic growth. In the
harsher, Populist version, railroads and industry capture the
legal system in the nineteenth century and twist it to their
design to force farmers, workers, passengers, and shippers to
subsidize their accident costs; but these groups organize in
their turn to qualify or repudiate the negligence principle
through employers' liability, railroad safety, and workmen's
compensation statutes; and gradually over this century the
courts come to recognize their interests in spreading the risks
of accidents by shifting them back to the enterprises that
"cause" them. Often the two versions are combined, present-
ing the law as having been perverted to private ends in the
nineteenth century but restored to the true norm of the public
interest in our own.
9 See, e.g., Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REv.
359 (1951).
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White deliberately turns his back on all such interpretations
- less, apparently, because he rejects them than because he
thinks them incomplete. An approach from the perspective of
intellectual history, he says, explains as much or more about
"the emergence of Torts as a distinct branch of law" (p. 3).
At first the choice of emphasis seems eccentric. Here is a
history of tort law that omits - with rare, fleeting exceptions
- any mention of railroad or industrial accidents, medical
malpractice, the personal injury bar, the contingent fee, acci-
dent and liability insurance, and the entire regime of relevant
public law - from workmen's compensation, the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability' ° and Safety Appliance Acts11 and statutory
limitations on defenses, to the modern Occupational Safety
and Health12 and Consumer Product Safety Acts13 and no-
fault automobile insurance plans. 14 In a way, White's selection
of his topic is unfortunate, as it would be fascinating to learn,
for example, who the lawyers were who took accident cases
in the nineteenth century and how they worked out the ground
rules of the negligence system with their opponents in the legal
departments of railroads, what was thought of as a strong case
and a weak one, what role the juries played, how damages
were categorized and measured, whether (as seems unlikely,
from what we now know'5 ) appellate doctrine was strictly
followed by trial courts or (as seems more likely) relaxed to
favor plaintiffs, and so forth. White is just not interested in
this level: his subject is juristic writing, and indeed such writ-
ing at its highest pitch of refinement. He rarely tells what
happens to tort doctrine in the opinions of ordinary state and
federal judges but concentrates instead on the law of the jur-
isconsults, the systematic efforts of academic writers and ac-
ademically minded judges.
Disappointing though it may be to those who keep hoping
for something completely different in the legal history line,
White's choice of emphasis is defensible. Surely the history of
legal ideas is an important branch of the history of political
and economic thought, of the way in which people try to
explain, justify, and rationalize the social arrangements under
which they live. And White's thesis that formal systems of
legal thought significantly influence the subject matter of tort
law is intriguing. The ideas of the mandarinate often deviate
10 45 U.S.C. §§ VI-6o (1976).
"Id. §§ i-i6.
12 29 id. §§ 651-678.
13 i5 id. §§ 2051-208i.
1
4 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-319 to -351 (West Supp. ig8o); uAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 9o, §§ 34 A- 3 4 J (West i969).
IS See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAV 423 (1973).
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from those of the bar generally, because of the academics'
professional predilection for theory and "reform." But it is
exactly for that reason that academic legal writers make such
good sources for the intellectual historian: they have already
done the spadework of trying to abstract a clear and concise
version of the common sense of their time, so as to bring
current practice into line with what they regard as its under-
lying core of principle. Even when they are least representa-
tive, because most critical of the contemporary common sense,
they are often most influential. Torts, as White often points
out, has notoriously been a field in which the wild academic
theories of one generation have become the practitioners'
cliches of the next. Furthermore, if one is trying, as White is,
to explain how formal systems of doctrine are made and un-
made, it is not a bad strategy to stick fairly closely to the
doctrinal writers themselves, rather than hunting far afield for
explanations from social context. For it is actually very dif-
ficult to account for the emergence of negligence as a general
organizing principle of tort liability as if it were a technological
response of the law to the "social needs of industrialization,"
for one would then have to explain, for instance, why England
and the United States seem to have undertaken the systematic
generalization of the fault principle to include all tort liability
at the same time (187o's and i88o's) despite England's much
earlier industrialization as well as why Germany responded to
industrialization by imposing strict liability on railroads and
industrial concerns for accidents by way of exception to a
preexisting fault standard! 16 There are simply too many var-
iables in economic growth to support a hypothesis that any of
them is socially "necessary."
It is likewise difficult to account for the negligence principle
simply as having been created by interest groups such as rail-
roads and factory owners, though undoubtedly lawyers for
these enterprises played a part in shaping the case law from
which the principle was synthesized and later in ensuring its
general diffusion through the profession. Lawyers commonly
believed that entrepreneurs had a stake in systematic legal
science because of its supposed benefits of certainty and pre-
dictability. 17 But that belief is only legal-intellectual ideology
,6 See F. LAWSON, NEGLIGENCE IN THE CIVIL LAW 45-46 (1950).
17 Morton Horwitz' much-criticized thesis that i9th century judges fiddled the
liability rules in part to help transporation and industrial enterprises externalize their
costs, M. HowRrTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-i86O, ch. 3
(1977) , seems to me perfectly correct if taken as a proposition about judicial ideology:
it's what the judges repeatedly said they wanted to do. Whether the rules had any
such effect is a totally different question, not resolvable by doctrinal history and
possibly not resolvable at all.
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and often not justified - as for example when entrepreneurs
want to change the rules, when they are indifferent to them
altogether, or when they prefer them in as tangled and con-
fusing a mess as possible.1 8  Employers who want to reduce
the cost of accidents can invest in favorable doctrine such as
the fellow servant rule; they can also invest in accident pre-
vention, overkill deterrent litigation, firing workmen who
bring tort claims, agitating against the contingent fee as a means
of financing claims, lobbying for state-funded insurance, etc.
Employers were quick enough to abandon the old war cry of
"no liability without fault" when compromise on workmen's
compensation offered the prospect of quieting labor trouble
over safety at an acceptable cost. 19
White does not suggest, nor should this critique of the
attribution of legal developments to sociological factors be
taken as, a plea for a return to the old idealistic view that
legal doctrine "evolved" solely through its own internal logic
in ways that had nothing to do with factories or railroads.
The point is just that the usual social theories connecting
doctrines to factories and railroads - that the doctrine "serves
social functions" or is the "product of interest-group pressures"
- are so unpersuasive in their current form that one cannot
blame a legal historian for taking up the much less problematic
task of trying to get straight at least what the doctrine was all
about.20
Ill.
For this purpose, however, White's book is not as infor-
mative as it might be. One hopes that an intellectual history
of a body of law will try to reconstruct the conceptual world
18 In the late x9th century, for example, one of the great projects of reform-minded
judges and legal academics was promoting "uniformity" by means of uniform state
laws, the application of "federal general common law" in diversity jurisdiction, and
the standardization of doctrine through authoritative treatises and casebooks, "na-
tional" law curricula like Harvard's, and heavy reliance on England as the mother
jurisdiction. Entrepreneurs took very little interest in any of this, preferring to exploit
the advantages of the hodgepodge muddle of law in a diverse federal system. See
Scheiber, Federalism and the American Economic Order, z789-19zo, io L, & Soc,
REV. 57, 117-18 (1975).
19 Friedman & Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 5o (1967).
20 The closest thing we have to a historical account attempting to vindicate an
instrumental theory of the relation of doctrine to economic behavior is a pathbreaking
study by a nonhistorian: Posner, A Theory of Negligence, i J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
I remain skeptical about whether, given the number and complexity of the variables
intervening between the statement of the rule and its application (see pp. 907-08
supra), any such theory is tenable.
[Vol. 94
HeinOnline -- 94 Harv. L. Rev.  908 1980-1981
BOOK REVIEW
of its creators, to describe their system of thought and the
sources they assembled to construct it, and perhaps also to
reveal its intellectual context, its relation to other contempo-
rary systems of thought. White's descriptive accounts of Sci-
ence, Realism, and Consensus are frustratingly vague; he
rarely tries except in the most general way to outline their
substantive content. His references to context tend to be to
shadowy names of intellectual movements; and he seems al-
most completely indifferent to exploring sources.
The advent of the idea of Legal Science is his master key
to understanding tort law of the late nineteenth century. Yet
we never learn much about where it came from or even what
it was, and what we do learn is muddled. Although it was
not until 187o that the legal elite found a solid institutional
home for their ideal at Harvard, they had aspired throughout
the nineteenth century, as White says (p. 252 n.22), to an
ideal of law based on a scientific scheme of principled classi-
fication. Of course, that late nineteenth century jurists talked
about science in more or less the same way as the previous
two generations does not mean there was nothing different in
how they actually went about doing it.21 White, though, offers
little assistance in defining the late nineteenth century version.
21 In ante bellum American legal texts the meanings of "legal science" were as
diffuse as references to the idea were frequent. It sometimes meant the empirical-
rational method of inducing "principles" from cases, sometimes also the grouping of
principles in some scheme of classification, and sometimes just the imposing mass of
liberal-classical background erudition that the educated practitioner was expected to
possess. By White's period these earlier meanings had mingled with more specific
ones: the systems of analytic classification suggested by John Austin's LECTURES ON
JURISPRUDENCE (S. Austin ed. 186-i863) and the methods of German legal-historical
scholarship. See, e.g., S. AMos, THE SCIENCE OF LAW 1-12 (1877). Scholars such
as Ames, Langdell, and Holmes mostly thought of Science in terms of these more
specific meanings, though Langdell's famous remarks -
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles. . . . Each of these
doctrines has arrived at its present state by slow degrees .... This growth is
to be traced in the main through a series of cases, and much the shortest and
best, if not the only way of mastering the doctrine effectually is by studying
the cases in which it is embodied.
C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS vi (1871) -
could have been made by any ante bellum lawyer. On the other hand, although
direct comparisons of legal to natural science were very common in the ante helium
period, my sense is that after 1870 serious and detailed lawyers' use of natural science
analogies in Anglo-American scholarship is very rare. An important exception perhaps
is Pollock's notion that law may be seen as probabilistic prediction of future decisions
from regularities in past ones. F. POLLOCK, The Science of Case-Law, in ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE AND ETHICS 237, 247-53 (1882). This is not at all to challenge
White's basic point that positive natural science was taken by most Americans to be
the model for learning in the late i9th century, but only to say that this very general
aspiration, shared by learned persons in all fields, is not very helpful in pinning down
the specific aims and methods of legal science.
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Initially, it seems to be "conceptualization" - the ordering of
knowledge into broad categories (p. 6).22 Later, Science is
described as the method of extracting general hypotheses by
induction from factual data and verifying them by application
to more facts: this "revolutionary" method is neatly exemplified
by Langdell's view of cases as the specimens that the common
lawyer sorts into classes according to principles (p. 26). So it
is, but the method is old-hat Baconianism! Perhaps White has
been misled by the nineteenth century legal elite's incessant
speechmaking about the need to make law scientific into sup-
posing that they adopted the methods of modern natural sci-
ence; actually, it would be awfully hard to show that most of
them even knew anything about it.23
One way to figure out what legal and other sciences spe-
cifically owed each other in this period would be to explore
parallels among fields. One might usefully start with scholars
whose tasks were similar to those of the legal writers, such as
historians of political institutions and ideas, philosophers con-
cerned with causation, or economists and social theorists, and
perhaps at some point go on to explore the striking resem-
blances between late nineteenth century legal thought and clas-
sical political economy, and finally consider the uses that legal
thought made of social evolutionism and of the "comparative
method" of philology and anthropology.
24
If that enterprise seemed too wildly ambitious, as naturally
it might, one could pull back to the conventional technique of
examining the sources that were cited by the legal writers them-
selves, which Mark DeWolfe Howe used beautifully in his
intellectual biography of Holmes. 25 Astonishingly, White does
not do any of this sourcework; he gets through two chapters
22 Unhappily, this view is first illustrated by the work of Nicholas St. John Green,
a brilliant forerunner of legal and philosophical pragmatism, whose actual ideas follow
more closely White's formula for Realism (p. 65) - "presentism, objectivism, empi-
ricism, and anti-universalism" - than that for Science.
23 President Eliot of Harvard, a real scientist, probably had no notion that his
law school dean was talking about a classical Roman idea when he said that law was
a science. Eliot thought the "scientific" thing at the Law School was its fancy new
"clinical" method of teaching: giving students first-hand exposure to the specimens,
actual cases, instead of filtering the cases through didactic treatises and lectures. See
Chase, The Birth of the Modern Law School, 23 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 329, 334-36
(1979), for comparisons of the "clinical" methods introduced at the Law School with
those promoted by Eliot at the Lawrence Scientific School, M.I.T., and the Harvard
Medical School.
24 
See, e.g., P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979);
J. BuRRow, EVOLUTION AND SOCIETY (x966); P. STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUTION (2980).
2s M. HowE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING YEARS 1870-
I882 (1963). See also the provocative sketch of C. FIFOOT, JUDGE AND JURIST IN
THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (1959).
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on legal science without any reference to its three founding
fathers, Austin, Bentham, and Maine; to Savigny, Jhering,
and the Pandectists, who strongly influenced English and
American academic lawyers through their study of Roman
legal classifications; 26 to the law faculty of Oxford, who de-
veloped Anglo-American Legal Science in partnership with
their American counterparts; or finally, to the many judges
- except Shaw and Doe, whom he mentions - who paved
the way for the scholars' generalizations. The effect is to blot
out almost the whole intellectual context of tort law in such
a way as to make it seem to spring, fully dressed in Victorian
frock coat, from the head of Holmes.
Matters improve when White reaches the more familiar
ground of Realism, but not by much: for example, we are told
that Leon Green's method is "functional" but are given only
the barest idea of what that means (pp. 85, 9o-91) and no
account of the collateral fields (such as the Chicago school of
sociology, Malinowskian anthropology, or institutional eco-
nomics) that tried to give it meaning. So too with the "Con-
sensus" writers of the late 194o's and 1950's. Why no comment
on the evident correspondences between their work and Par-
sonian sociology and pluralist political science? This is all
most strange in a work whose announced design is to account
for what happened in tort law by shifts in its intellectual
context. The contextual ideas all come and go under their
most cryptic labels - "empiricism," "behaviorism," etc. At
one point, for instance, White offers to explain legal science
as "Victorian" in its origins. Expectations rise at the prospect
of a new cultural genre of legal history, perhaps comparing
law in Victoria's reign to her architecture, novels, social the-
ory, interior decoration - only to be dashed when "Victori-
anism" turns out to be nothing more than an "interest in
deriving secular and scientific theories that would promote
order and unity in a modern industrialized setting" (p. 6).
IV.
In conjunction with his thesis that doctrinal developments
influence the subject matter of tort law, White presents a few
sociological explanations. "Industrialization," banished as a
cause of the negligence principle, is readmitted as the cause of
the undermining of traditional stability that led Victorians to
26 See, e.g., F. POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS I-I 5 (1887); Holmes, The Theory
of Torts, 7 AM. L. REv. 652, 660-63 (1873). See generally F. WHARTON, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE passim (1874).
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wish to reconstitute social order through science (p. 5), as well
as of the "sudden complexity and interdependence" of social
life, to which both Science (p. 26) and Consensus thought (p.
145) were reactions. "Professionalization" is also listed among
the causes of Science: this is the familiar idea that the univer-
sity as an environment for training lawyers is more likely than
apprenticeship to encourage theoretical work (pp. 23-25). This
explanation will do for the academics, but not for the judges:
Can one explain the taste for formal generalization that char-
acterized the Waite, Fuller, and White Courts as the product
of "professionalization"? By itself, the sociological explanation
based on professionalism fails, and, even when accompanied
by White's suggested intellectual mechanism - judges follow-
ing the lead of academics - it is unsatisfying as an explanation
of this phenomenon. One is led to think that behind the
generalizing impulse something deeper was at work.
Occasionally, though, White's remarks do point toward the
possibility of a cultural-legal history that would be very much
worth having: how "interests" in property and, personality have
been constructed in legal thought, how different kinds of suf-
fering have been moved in and out of the category of com-
pensable harms, and how losses it would once have shocked
people even to think about pricing have come to be routinely
valued in money.27 With his doctorate in American Studies,
White would seem the very legal historian most likely to realize
this possibility, but the achievement falls short of the aspira-
tion, for the examples are supported by nothing more than his
assertion. 28  Thus, he says recognition of mental distress as a
27 The mass marketing of life insurance, for example, was made difficult for
decades by, among other things, the unwillingness of prospective purchasers to set a
money value on human life. Even after buying life insurance became common in the
1870's there was resistance - in insurance circles as well as in society in general -
to valuing the lives of women and children, and there were frequent legislative
attempts to prohibit insurance of children. See V. ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 62-63 (1979).
Incidentally, this seems a more plausible explanation for the exclusion of "sentimental
factors" such as the survivors' grief from damages in children's death cases in the
19 th century than Professor Posner's hypothesis that "a child of working-class parents
was sometimes viewed by them as an income-producing asset whose destruction could
be compensated for in much the same way as the destruction of property." Posner,
supra note 20, at 47.
25 The funniest of these ad hoc sociological perceptions is the reason White suggests
for the revival of Conceptualism in modern legal scholarship: that "skepticism toward
previously unifying cultural values, such as patriotism, 'decency,' or 'equal opportu-
nity"' has stimulated a "concern with personal values"; the "theoretical focus" of
Neoconceptualism "becomes a form of communicating a personal statement of values
to others .... [T]he effort seems less to ensure that the theory is authoritative than
to express it as forcefully as one can" (p. 213). Can anyone resist this portrayal of the
leading Neoconceptualists, Professors Posner and Epstein, as the Flower Children of
Hyde Park?
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legally compensable injury arose because psychologists helped
make emotional injury respectable and developed diagnostic
techniques for telling real from feigned distress and because in
the 192o's and 1930's people came to think the state should
act to relieve mental suffering (p. 103), but then fails to
support this theory with a single reference. Later, he opines
that the right to privacy "became important when America
became more heterogeneous, crowded, urbanized, and socially
mobile: it was a respite from the pressures of living in a
complex world" (p. 173), which seems hardly more plausible
than its opposite ("As Americans moved out of the stifling
confines of village communities into urban neighborhoods of
strangers, privacy was more easily obtained and therefore less
urgently desired.") would be.
Similarly, the book argues that, in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, the main purpose of tort law was admonishing blame-
worthy persons, but gradually over the twentieth century, the
purpose became the compensation of injured ones; and this
shift in objectives - the result of life in increasingly "inter-
dependent" society - explains not only the shift away from
negligence toward strict liability but also the spread of insur-
ance (pp. 147-50, 170-72, 231-32). Statements such as this
are common, but what do they really mean? Is this another
version of Dicey's movement from "individualist" to "collectiv-
ist" politics; 29 or something perhaps more subtle, a shift from
a moral universe in which everything that happens to human
beings is seen either as the consequence of someone's moral
choice (a poor man is to blame for his own poverty) or of some
unalterable natural order (the poor ye shall always have with
you) to a conception that all social consequences, including so-
called moral choice, are linked to all others in more or less
determined or manipulable networks of causal necessity (pov-
erty is a condition produced by the conjunction of certain "so-
cial forces")?
In any case, is it true that the jurists' view of the main
purpose of tort theory has moved from blaming defendants to
compensating plaintiffs? If one looks at tort damages theory,
the proposition only holds true in a time frame different from
White's, for, by the late nineteenth century, the practice of
allowing juries in tort cases to assess "smart money" (punitive
damages) against defendants they disliked was already in thor-
ough disrepute; the treatise writers agreed that unless there
was aggravation in the form of recklessness or malice, "the
only available remedy which the law can give for a wrong is
29 See A. DICEY, LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW & PUBLIC OPIN-
ION IN ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1905).
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an award of money estimated as an equivalent for the damage
suffered."' 30 In short, the Scientists thought compensating in-
juries was a purpose of tort law, just as we do, but they
distinguished (as we do) compensable from noncompensable
harms, and they required (as we do) justification of some kind
for requiring the defendant to pay the compensation. As
White's Realists kept pointing out, resolving even the question
of whether the defendant caused the harm to the plaintiff
involved some judgment about the desirability of the parties'
conduct; is the immobile person the victim of, or a harmful
obstruction to, the mobile one? Perhaps White means simply
that our moral economy has been shifting from one of punish-
ments and rewards to one of incentives and disincentives, or
even to a way of thinking that fully accepts the subjectivity
of preferences and seeks only their efficient maximization: the
defendant must pay not because he is a wrongdoer, but be-
cause he can most cheaply avoid or insure against accidents.
Yet even this opposition obscures the warfare between moral
and amoral standards in our law. As White well knows, even
at the height of Science, Holmes, Wigmore, and Ames were
all disputing whether the "fault" standard of liability had been
historically evolving towards or away from concern with actual
moral blameworthiness; 31 and Holmes, who took what is ap-
parently White's side of this issue when it arises in the twen-
tieth century - that tort liability has moved away from moral
fault toward some objective external standard that the state
happens to fix upon - immediately suggested the instability
of such a single-minded approach to tort analysis when he
revived malicious motive as the touchstone of liability for
interference with contractual relations. 32 White's proposition
would surely stand no better chance of unanimous support
among today's jurists, who seem about evenly divided among
those who would rationalize liability rules on grounds of eco-
3 0
See, e.g., T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 6o (i88o). For a
view of the principle in transition, see T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE
OF DAMAGES 38-44 (1847).
31 See O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW iio-Ii (188i); Ames, Law and Morals,
22 HARv. L. REV. 97 (igo8); Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History
(pts. I-3), 7 HARV. L. REV. 315, 383, 441 (1894). Nathan Isaacs tried to compose
the quarrel through the ingenious resolution that moral and objective standards for
liability alternated cyclically through history: objective standards represented attempts
to codify current morals into bright-line rules; these rules tended to collapse as morals
changed but reappeared to codify the changes. See Isaacs, Fault and Liability, 31
HARV. L. REV. 954 (igi8).
32 See Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894). See also
the excellent discussion in Note, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations in
the Nineteenth Century: The Transformation of Property, Contract, and Tort, 93
HARv. L. REV. 1510, 1526-27, 1535-37 (i98o).
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nomic efficiency, those who would rely on neo-Kantian morals,
and those choosing some "trade-off between utility and
fairness.
V.
I think most of the problems of interpretation in this book
may stem from a common source: White's unwillingness -
paradoxical in an intellectual historian who tries to hold at
arm's length anything smelling like a "materialist" influence on
tort law - to take doctrine fully seriously as an intellectual
project. Although he perceives that the theories of the aca-
demics work a significant impact on the law, he treats his
jurists a little as one would children going through a "phase":
tort doctrine was highly conceptual in the late nineteenth cen-
tury because Conceptualism was the going thing; when the
intellectual fashion changed, the doctrine was "atomized"; now
the fashion has changed back.
[Nlothing about the subject matter of [torts] compels one
organization of the field or another. Tort law could just as
well be an incoherent mass as a tightly knit subject whose
elements are arranged in a "philosophically continuous series."
*. . Thus proposals for emphasizing one or another feature
of tort law do not have to reckon with some inherent tendency
in the subject to lend itself to one theory of liability or another.
They have to reckon, rather, with the prevailing intellectual
wisdom of the time. (P. 233).
It is as if the legal intellectuals, poor beasts, cannot help
getting coated with the sticky stuff of contemporary intellectual
opinion. 33 But from time to time White recognizes that some-
thing much more than this is at stake, and that the efforts of
torts scholars and judges to bring some coherence to the field
is part of a deadly serious attempt to rationalize the ground
rules of interactive life in liberal society. The jurists may be
seen as engaged in a continuing effort to work out solutions
to a single political problem, each successive solution trying to
respond to the perceived failings of its predecessors. The prob-
lem itself is simply stated: how to prevent people, who must
interact with one another in order to realize their humanity
33 His postulate of this sort of intellectual determinism makes puzzling his later
worries that legal academics have too much unaccountable power because their "value
premises . . . affect decisively the contents of laws that persons outside professional
communities are intended to follow" (pp. 242-43), for, if one accepts the argument of
his book, they too are only soaking up the ideas of their time. Asking for political
accountability for this process is rather like asking, "Who elected Einstein?" or even
"Who elected God?"
1981]
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and improve their common condition, from oppressing or de-
stroying one another. In liberal theory the solution is to insti-
tute the state, which defines "rights and duties" - zones of
action and immunity within which each person may act freely
- and sanctions transgressions of those zones; but in so doing,
poses a new problem in the form of its own power to oppress
or destroy, which must be limited in turn. Legal thinkers of
the late nineteenth century, building on the labors of prede-
cessors, tried to work out a systematic formal solution to these
problems. The task of the "rule of law" was to specify the
scope and limits of autonomous conduct, through rules that
would be knowable (at least to persons advised by lawyers) in
advance, and general, so as to apply to all legal persons
equally. Rules thus formulated would inform individuals how
far they could go without infringing the freedom of others,
and would keep the state in check as well by depriving its
officers of discretion in handling claims of infringement.
So the passion of scientific classification of rights and duties
arose from something much more fundamental than a vague
hankering to share the prestige of academic science: generality
of legal thought was considered a precondition to liberty and
equality. The negligence principle seemed a perfect candidate
for a general rule of private law, defining the rights and duties
of individuals toward one another. Judges had already been
at work synthesizing the principle, so that it could be shown
to have been gradually evolving out of prior law. Unlike the
grab bag of traditional actions on the case, it did not impose
different rights and duties on parties of different status, but
applied equally to everyone. Moreover, the imposition of lia-
bility for fault, like that for breach of contract, did not at first
seem to involve any policies external to the will of the parties,
posing no problem of potentially illicit state coercion. And, of
course, in conjunction with the doctrines of contract, assump-
tion of risk, and contributory negligence, it appeared to pro-
vide a flawless justification for the suffering routinely endured
in social life.
Unless... a prudent man would have foreseen the possibility
of harm, it is no more justifiable to make me indemnify my
neighbor against the consequences, than to make me do the
same thing if I had fallen upon him in a fit, or to compel me
to insure him against lightning.
34
The naturalism of the metaphor is striking: if your right
(to be secure against harms resulting from my wrongful con-
34 O.W. HOLMES, supra note 31, at 96.
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duct) is not violated, no human agency has done anything to
you at all, and you are to see yourself as a victim of circum-
stances, "industrial society," life in a "complex interdependent
world," a bolt of lightning.
There is absolutely nothing new in this account of the aims
of legal science; 35 it is all explicit, along with the seeds of its
undoing, in what are probably the most famous sections of
Holmes' Common Law. 36 We read it now and think, "How
could anyone have thought that judgments as obviously so-
cially and politically contingent as those about what is and is
not reasonable risk-creating activity could be developed into
general nondiscretionary rules of conduct?" But the point is
that these aims led the legal scientists to think so, and, as
White recognizes, that we do not because their successors,
including the paradoxical Holmes himself, showed us so con-
vincingly that these abstract doctrinal formulations are empty
of predictive content for particular cases.
VI.
Once one recasts the beginning of White's story this way,
the rest becomes a useful account of the ways in which scholars
and judges have tried to salvage the liberal theory of justice
from the wreckage of Science: If you can't achieve the aims of
liberal justice by rules specifying the limits of autonomous
conduct in advance, how can you do it? The usual response
in the 192o's and 1930's was that the aims could be reached
by a policy-oriented balancing of interests, founded on observ-
able regularities in judicial decisionmaking. The most dra-
matic moments in this book come when the proponents of
doctrine confront those of interest balancing, the doctrinalists
accusing the Realist of lacking any general organizing ideas,
the Realist replying that doctrine was certainly general but
completely vacuous. What saved liberal legalism from the
impasse, White says, were (i) the threat of Nazism (thus in-
troducing for the first time - at pages 139-42 - an explicitly
political consideration) and (2) Consensus thought, represented
in torts by Dean Prosser. The first relieved the pressure to
justify how liberal societies were run by means of the conso-
lation that at least they were different from the terrifying
alternatives. The second defused the confrontation between
35 In fact, I would probably have just assumed these aims but for the absence of
any reference to them in the book (save in the curiously parochial guise of an American
cultural characteristic - "rationality as a core value of American law" (p. 142)).
Maybe White has just assumed them, but it doesn't look that way.
36 See O.W. HOLMES, supra note 31, at 77-63.
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Realists and their opponents by lowering it a notch or two into
the practical and commonsense context of a very superior
hornbook. White is most interesting and even brilliant when
he argues that the field was kept in equilibrium throughout
the 195o's and i96o's in part through Prosser's artful, simul-
taneous embrace of the doctrinal and Realist perspectives that
had over and over again demonstrated one another's incoher-
ence (pp. 159-63, 176-78).
White himself has apparently suffered a permanent loss of
faith. The claims that "the process of judging is somehow
inherently rational," that "the legal system in America is based
on an inexorable rationality," that "for every problem there is
a consensual rational solution," strike him simply as incidents
of yet another intellectual fashion, the prevailing canons of the
postwar world (p. 209), that has passed and now seems some-
what quaint. The summons to rally once more around the
new standards of Paretianism or Rawlsian neo-Kantianism
fails to stir his blood: he sees in them little more than the
professional academics' fondness for comprehensive systems,
and assumes they will shortly go the way of all the others (pp.
242-43). Yet nothing about what he depicts as the collapse of
the idea of the rule of law and the futility of trying to recon-
stitute it drives him to despair, or to the energetic attempt to
imagine an alternative politics; or even seems to bother him
very much. Is it wrong to see in this book the symptoms of
a liberal legalism so enervated that even its historians have
forgotten the urgent reasons for its creation?
A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE. By Jan Gorecki.1 New
York: Columbia University Press. 1979. Pp. xv, i85. $15.00.
Reviewed by Ira P. Robbins
2
The problem of crime has been approached from many
perspectives, including that of the offender, 3 the victim, 4 the
I Professor of Sociology, University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana.
2 Professor of Law and Pauline Ruyle Moore Scholar in Public Law (1980-1981),
The American University, Washington College of Law.
3 See, e.g., S. GLUECK & E. GLUECK, UNRAVELING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
(195I); S. GLUECK & E. GLUECK, PHYSIQUE AND DELINQUENCY (X956); E. KRETSCH-
MER, PHYSIQUE AND CHARACTER (1936); W. SHELDON:, VARIETIES OF DELINQUENT
YOUTH ('949); THE PROFESSIONAL THIEF (E. Sutherland ed. 1937); Gibbons &
Garrity, Definition and Analysis of Certain Criminal Types, 53 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
27 (I962); Kessler & Moos, The XYY Karyotype and Criminality: A Review, 7 J.
PSYCH. RESEARCH 153 (I97o); Tappan, Some Myths About the Sex Offender, FED.
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norms being violated,5 the supporting subcultural norms, 6 the
availability of resources and opportunity, 7 and the system of
social control.8 The simplification of the problem to any sin-
gular aspect, however, has not been fruitful in developing
either crime control strategies or their ideological justifications.
The multiple objectives of restraint, general deterrence, spe-
cific deterrence, rehabilitation, desert, and public education,
though necessarily intertwined, have been impossible to rec-
oncile, and so have intensified the problem. Criminology has
thus become a tormented field where armies of theorists com-
pete for acceptance, but without adequately preventing or con-
trolling crime.
The intent of Jan Gorecki's A Theory of Criminal Justice
is "to discover an optimal policy for crime control" (p. xiii).
Rejecting alternative crime control policies as being "for the
most part too vague ever to be tested, tautological, or evidently
false," 9 Gorecki claims to present "not just another hunch but
PROBATION, June 1955, at 7. Compare C. LOMBROSO, CRIME, ITS CAUSES AND
REMEDIES (1912), and E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, CRIMINOLOGY 120 (ioth ed.
1978), with C. GORING, THE ENGLISH CONVICT (1913).
4 See, e.g., PERSPECTIVES ON VICTIMOLOGY (W. Parsonage ed. 1979); M. WOLF-
GANG, PATTERNS IN CRIMINAL HOMICIDE (1958); Wolfgang, Victim Precipitated
Criminal Homicide, 48 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. i (1957). See generally VICTIMOLOGY
(quarterly journal established in 1976).
' See, e.g., I. CHEIN, D. GERARD, R. LEE & E. ROSENBERG, THE ROAD TO H
(1964); E. LEMERT, HUMAN DEVIANCE, SOCIAL PROBLEMS, AND SOCIAL CONTROL
(1967); E. SCHUR, CRIMES WITHOUT VICTIMS (1965); C. SHAw, THE JACK ROLLER
(I930); L. WILKINS, SOCIAL DEVIANCE (1964); Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminali-
zation, 374 ANNALS I58 (1967); Schwartz, Moral Offenses and the Model Penal Code,
63 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1963).
6 See, e.g., F. ALEXANDER & W. HEALY, ROOTS OF CRIME (1935); A. COHEN,
DELINQUENT BOYS (1955); R MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE
(1968); T. SELLIN, CULTURE CONFLICT AND CRIME (1938); C. SHAw & H. MCKAY,
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND URBAN AREAS (1969); Lemert, Social Structure, Social
Control, and Deviation in ANOMIE AND DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 57 (M. Clinard ed.
1964); Merton, Social Structure and Anomie, 3 AM. SOC. REV. 672 (1938); Miller,
Lower Class Culture as a Generating Milieu of Gang Delinquency, 14 J. SOC. ISSUES
5 (I958); O'Donnell, The Rise and Decline of a Subculture, I5 SOC. PROB. 73 (1967);
Yablonsky, The Delinquent Gang as a Near Group, 7 SoC. PROB. io8 (1959).
7 See, e.g., R. CLOWARD & L. OHLIN, DELINQUENCY AND OPPORTUNITY (I960);
L. EMPEY, AMERICAN DELINQUENCY 294-300 (1978); Cloward, Illegitimate Means,
Anomie, and Deviant Behavior, 24 AM. Soc. REV. 164 (1959); Glaser & Rice, Crime,
Age, and Employment, 24 AM. Soc. REV. 68o (1959).
8 See, e.g., M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES (1973); W. GAYLIN, PARTIAL
JUSTICE (1974); H. MILLER, W. McDONALD & J. CRAMER, PLEA BARGAINING IN
THE UNITED STATES (1978); H. PEPINSKY, CRIME CONTROL STRATEGIES (1979);
ROUGH JUSTICE (J. Robertson ed. 1974); J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL
(1966); J. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR (1968); Mott, Albright & Sem-
merling, Judicial Personnel, 167 ANNALS 143 (i933); Nagel, Judicial Backgrounds
and Criminal Cases, 53 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 333 (1962); Newman, Pleading Guilty
for Considerations: A Study of Bargain Justice, 46 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 780 (1956).
9 See also note 26 infra; p. 928 & note 5I infra.
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a viable theory . . . about what makes and unmakes the
criminal" (p. xiii).
He sees the administration of criminal justice as the most
important determinant of criminality, believing criminal law
to be "a tool of moral learning by the society at large" (p. xiii).
Moral education inculcates an internalized aversion that "ef-
fectively prevents both calculated and emotional wrongdoing"
(P. 3), since it is "a powerful motivation, much stronger than
the fear of sanction" (p. xiii). Thus, Gorecki rejects retributive
and other utilitarian models as the primary justifications for
punishment (p. xiv), and opts instead for the educative func-
tion, which is both more effective and "nobler" (p. 3).
The social origins of moral drives, Gorecki argues, are
rooted in "persuasive communications" and "instrumental
learning" (pp. 6, io). The former concept encompasses the
socialization by institutional encounters (such as familial, re-
ligious, and judicial) that instill visceral "moral evaluations"
- "the perception of which conduct is right or wrong and the
experience of duty or guilt emerging in response to ideas of
right or wrong conduct" (p. 7). Instrumental learning is es-
sentially Pavlovian: the "behavior of any ...organism is, to
a large extent, an outcome of its likely consequences.
[R]ewarding effects of behavior X reinforce X, while
punishing effects reinforce avoidance of X" (p. io).10 Among
the conditions for maximizing the efficacy of this general theory
of learning are the sufficient intensity and proper timing of the
rewards or punishments (pp. 12-13). Further, for a sanction
to convey a moral lesson, both the observers and the sanc-
tioned person must recognize the punished behavior as intrins-
ically wrong, and the punishment as "just" (i.e., its distribu-
tion must match the moral experiences prevailing in the group);
the sanctioning agent must be respected and trusted; and the
sanctions must be consistent for like circumstances and dis-
tributed according to uniform criteria (pp. 19-22). Applied to
a system of criminal justice,11 the theory would provide for a
"just" punishment to follow every crime. "This would, in
turn, bring, through the process of moral learning, a sweeping
decline in criminal behavior, and, consequently, alleviation of
the crime-engendered social ills" (p. 127).
10 For an overview of learning theory principles, see, e.g., E. HILGARD, THEORIES
OF LEARNING (2d ed. 1956). See also C. HULL, A BEHAVIOR SYSTEM (x958); B.F.
SKINNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF ORGANISMS (1938); E. TOLMAN, PURPOSIVE BEHAVIOR
IN ANIMALS AND MEN (1932).
" For a good statement of the behavioral position in the criminal context, see,
e.g., C. BARTOL, CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 36o-62 (ig8o).
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Gorecki would make only "the necessary minimum"
changes in the legal system, though even "this implies an
overhaul of considerable proportions" (p. 94). He would de-
criminalize homosexuality and drug abuse crimes (pp. 95-96),
abolish plea bargaining (p. 109), 1 2 eliminate parole and the
treatment of individual offenders (pp. 47-48), and, as the most
effective method of cutting costs within the system, "simplify"
criminal procedures (p. iii), perhaps abolishing the jury sys-
tem.13 In addition, because acquisition of evidence "must be
reasonably easy" if law enforcement is to be more certain and
thus educative, and since "early interrogation of suspects con-
stitutes a particularly valuable implement for acquisition of
evidence" (pp. 81-83), obstacles in the way of evidence gath-
ering must be rethought. This is particularly true of confes-
sions (pp. 83-89, 1i7-26). Thus, Gorecki would allow "a
reasonable degree of pressure" 1 4 to be brought to bear upon
a suspect (p. 12o), allow the prosecution free rein to comment
at trial on the suspect's refusal to speak (pp. 84, 125), and
restrict or eliminate prohibitions on illegal search and seizure
(pp. 81-83), coercive self-incrimination (pp. 117-26),'5 and
deprivations of the right to counsel (pp. 84, 125) - at the
12 "[Bjargained pleas should be perceived as conspiracies to obstruct justice rather
than as components of its administration" (p. 52).
13 Although this Review is not intended to address Gorecki's attempt to "cut costs"
within the system (pp. Io9-I5), that feature of his theory is not beyond challenge.
See, e.g., Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 404
(1976): "[Tlhe application of cost-benefit analysis to crime control is dangerous. The
more repressive the criminal law becomes, the more likely it will be to hide its 'costs."'
Compare id. and Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law: A Rejoinder to Professor
Morse, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1269 (1976), with Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Cri-
minology: A Reply to Judge Bazelon, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247 (1976), and Morse,
The Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Final Word, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275 (1976).
14 The "proper demarcation line" between reasonable and unreasonable pressure
on a suspect to confess would depend "on the moral views of the society at large as
perceived by the Court" (p. II9), as well as on the "judicial perception of basic social
needs to be served by criminal justice" (p. 125). Moreover, Professor Gorecki argues
that "[tjhe economic advantages of confession are clear: a confession during interrog-
ation, if corroborated, results, at arraignment, in a plea of guilty, and, like any guilty
plea, cuts expenditure and reduces workload" (p. 117). See also note 13 supra.
Is Cf. Brown v. Walker, i6i U.S. 591, 596 (1896) ("[T]he admissions or confessions
of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked high in the
scale of incriminating evidence."). See also F. INBAu & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTER-
ROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (2d ed. 1967); THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME
AND ITS IMPACT - AN ASSESSMENT I (1967) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION].
Much of Gorecki's treatment of self-incrimination is taken from Gorecki, Miranda
and Beyond - The Fifth Amendment Reconsidered, r975 U. ILL. L.F. 295. The
reason for his emphasis on self-incrimination, rather than on, or in conjunction with,
some of these other prohibitions, particularly illegal search and seizure, is never made
clear.
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least requiring the overruling or legislating out of existence of
Malloy v. Hogan,16 Escobedo v. Illinois,17 and Miranda v.
Arizona18 (p. 125). "[L]ife committed to crime is essentially
miserable," says Gorecki, and these changes will cause poten-
tial lawbreakers to "forego the criminal way and avoid the
misery" (p. 133).
The reader who assumes that such drastic proposals would
stand on solid footing would be mistaken. A Theory of Crim-
inal Justice is a didactical apologetic for the reduction of
individual rights of suspects and defendants in the pursuit of
increased convictions and a safer society (pp. xi-xiii) - with-
out, however, a satisfactory justifying scheme.
I.
The major flaw in Gorecki's work is not one of law, of
government, of politics, or of economics; it is one of knowl-
edge. For a theory that is supposedly "specific enough for
potential refutation" (p. xiii), his book is unjustifiably vague.
He leaves undefined and unexplored the concepts and mech-
anisms that are at the heart of his theory, unsuccessfully fi-
nessing the intractable problems facing our criminal justice
system. Gorecki then naively calls for a monolithic theoretical
approach to the monumentally complex problem of crime.
The first sentence of the text illustrates the emptiness of
Gorecki's theory: "Criminal law can be applied as an imple-
ment of moral education: following a properly arranged appli-
cation of punishments, the prohibited behavior becomes more
16 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination held
applicable to the states through the due process clause of the 14 th amendment).
V 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (confession taken from defendant in custody held inadmis-
sible because defendant had requested and was denied opportunity to consult an
attorney and was not warned of right to remain silent).
is 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (police have duty to warn defendant of right to remain
silent, of potential adverse use of any statements, of right to have attorney present at
custodial interrogation, and of indigent's right to court-appointed counsel). "If faith-
fully implemented, the dictates of Miranda can only result in the virtual disappearance
of confessions" (p. 86). Cf. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (r949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring in result) ("[Any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain
terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances."). But see, e.g.,
Seeburger & Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh - A Statistical Study, 29 U. PiTT. L.
REV. I, 26 (1967) (While the results could not be generalized, in Pittsburgh "Miranda
has not impaired significantly the ability of the law enforcement agencies to apprehend
and convict the criminal."). To protect the innocent and still provide "reasonable
procedural fairness" (p. 122), Gorecki would judicially supervise questioning by such
means as sound or visual recordings of all station house interrogations, random checks
of field questioning by specially trained judicial officers, and an improved system of
sanctioning police misconduct (pp. 122-26).
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forcefully perceived by the society as intrinsically wrong and
is avoided as immoral" (p. 3). What is a properly arranged
application of punishments? The only clue Gorecki gives is
that a proper system of punishments would "grade the sanc-
tions according to the harmfulness of the offense" (p. 98), with
the highest penalties going to the most serious offenders. 19
But he makes no attempt to develop a working definition of
either "harm" or "seriousness." ' 20 The only guide to "serious-
ness" is noncommittal: "the degree of a defendant's guilt would
be determined by our feeling of blameworthiness of his crim-
inal act" - that is, "the feeling dominant in the society" (p.
io6 ).21 If the most serious offenders could be isolated, more-
over, how high should the "highest" penalties be? 22 Other
crucial terms are dealt the same fate as "proper," "harm," and
((seriousness" - for example, "justice,'' 23 "basic social needs"
(p. 125), and "like cases"' 24 (p. 59). Thus, while Professor
19 "Proper" as a critical but undefined conclusory term plagues Gorecki's book.
See, e.g., pp. 4, 73, 93.
20 See also p. 104 (Prosecutors "should be duty bound to charge (suspects] with
the crime committed - at least when the crime is serious.").
Gorecki finesses this operational vagueness by citing an example of a crime that
is serious: large-scale heroin trafficking (p. 98). He only explains, however, why
trafficking is serious vis-h-vis drug use (the latter harms only the offender, the former
harms others); he leaves the reader at sea as to how to evaluate seriousness when the
crimes are of wholly different types or neither is "victimless."
The practical difficulty of evaluating the relative seriousness of crimes has been
often noted. See generally Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238,
254-59 (3d Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 445 U.S. 388 (i98o);
United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Lupo v. Norton, 371
F. Supp. 156, 162-63 (D. Conn. 1974); 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1979) (federal parole
guidelines); Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Parole Release Guidelines, 5i U. CoLo.
L. REv. 237, 244-45 (i98o); Curtis, Federal Judicial Power, Parole Guidelines, and
Sentence Reform, in 2 PRISONERS' RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK 91 (I. Robbins ed. xg8o);
Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J.
81o, 822-28, 835-38 (1975).
21 See also p. r1o.
22 The same problem of definitional vagueness plagues Gorecki's discussion of
judicial discretion in sentencing. Statutory ranges of sentences should be of "reason-
able width" (p. io5), and appellate courts reviewing such sentences should strike
down only "violations of justice that are gross enough to be obvious" (p. io8).
23 To Gorecki, "the term justice is metaethical: its use does not imply adherence
to any particular system of normative ethics" (p. 2 r). Rather, a criminal system is
"just" if its distribution of rewards and punishments is evaluated as "morally right"
by members of society; that is, "if the distribution matches moral experiences pre-
vailing in the group" (p. 21). Given the difficulty of detecting the dominant moral
experiences of society, see p. 924 infra, this definition is not very illuminating or
"testable."
24 To determine whether cases are "like," would Gorecki focus on the act, the
actor, or both? See generally Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal in
American Criminal Justice, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 147, i55 (1978) ("[Olne of the
problems of present sentencing schemes is that in the effort to avoid disparities
I98I]
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Gorecki is quick to recognize the ambiguities in other theorists'
critical terms, his suffer the same problem. 25  This is most
unfortunate, since questions of the administration and mag-
nitude of punishment are at the very heart of current judi-
cial, 26 legislative, 27 and academic 28 criminal justice debate.
Gorecki's theory is primarily, if not exclusively, founded
on a vision of moral education, but his effort to decipher the
language of morals is incomplete at best, and at worst hollow
or wrongheaded. What are the actually accepted basic moral
values and how are they determined? Although he suggests
that public opinion polls can be useful (pp. 7, 36-37, 144 n.20,
147 n.65), Gorecki's main instrument for this task is "intro-
spection" (pp. 4-6, i7): "observing our own mental processes
and the body movements [including verbal expressions] re-
sulting from them and inferring contents of the mental pro-
cesses of others, by analogy, from their body movements" (p.
5). 29
resulting from punishing people differently who have done the same thing, we may
now tend to punish people the same way who have committed crimes in very different
circumstances."); see also Coffee, The Repressed Issues of Sentencing: Accountability,
Predictability, and Equality in the Era of the Sentencing Commission, 66 GEo. L.J.
975, 981-1oo8, xo59 (1978); Gottfredson, Parole Board Decisionmaking: A Study of
Disparity Reduction and the Impact of Institutional Behavior, 70 J. CRIm. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 77 (i979).
25 See, e.g., pp. xiii, 68, 13o; Gorecki, Crime Causation Theories: Failures and
Perspectives, 25 BRaIT. J. Soc. 461, 464 (1974) (criticizing Sutherland's "differential
association" theory and Freudian psychoanalytics). See also id. at 469-70 (criticizing
deterrence theories); note 5I infra.
26 See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 283 (I98O) (mandatory life sentence,
imposed pursuant to Texas habitual offender statute, for a defendant convicted of
three nonviolent, property-related felonies totaling $229.1i, does not violate the cruel
and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment) ("We all, of course, would
like to think that we are 'moving down the road toward human decency.' Within the
confines of this judicial proceeding, however, we have no way of knowing in which
direction that road lies. Penologists themselves have been unable to agree whether
sentences should be light or heavy, discretionary or determinate." (citations omitted)).
See also Adams v. Texas, 100 S. Ct. 2521 (i98o); Beck v. Alabama, ioo S. Ct. 2382
(298o); Godfrey v. Georgia, Ioo S. Ct. 2759 (1980); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 253 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 4o8 U.S. 238
(1972).
27 See, e.g., S. 1722, 1723, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (i979); H.R. 6915, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. (ig8o).
2
8 See, e.g., A. DERSHOWITz, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976); M. FRAN-
KEL, supra note 8; W. GAYLIN, supra note 8; JUSTICE IN SENTENCING (L. Orland
& H. Tyler eds. 1974); P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, TOWARD A JUST
AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM (1977); R. SINGER, JUST DESERTS (2979); A.
VON HIRSCH & K. HANRAHAN, THE QUESTION OF PAROLE (1979).
29 Introspection tells Gorecki, for example, that "[tjoday ... the support for some
[prohibitions, such as bans on gambling, drug abuse, vagrancy, suicide, and forni-
cation] is waning and the opposition grows: before our eyes they are becoming
obviously unjust" (p. 35).
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This set of words, however, provides no clue to how his
theory can workably be used to guide the criminal justice
system. For example, Gorecki questions whether punishment
of homosexuality is "just," i.e., whether the distribution of
rewards and punishments matches the moral experiences that
prevail in the group. He then declares that the predominant
moral influence in the group is a combination of liberalism
and utilitarianism. These moralities, he says, dictate punish-
ment of harmful acts only, and homosexuality is not harmful.
He thus concludes that the punishment of homosexual behav-
ior is "unjust." This injustice "undermines the general edu-
cative power of criminal law" (pp. 33-38).30 Without a better
indicator of the prevailing moral influences of society than
Gorecki poses, it is impossible to test this syllogism. Thus, his
reasoning contributes nothing to the efforts to define the proper
scope of our criminal justice system. Moreover, to the extent
that one could divine such predominant moral influences, Go-
recki's concentration on the moral experiences that "prevail"
in the group (pp. 21, 118), the "dominant" feeling of justice
(pp. io6, 129), and the "needs of society" (pp. 8-9, 119, 125)
could have serious detrimental consequences. Surely subsocie-
tal groups have different moral experiences, different percep-
tions of justice, and different needs,3 ' as Gorecki recognizes
at one point (p. io6). If his theory is addressed only to the
"basic consensus" of society at large, as it appears to be (pp.
xiii, 8i, io6), then not only is the thesis ingenuous, but it also
likely would result in maintenance of the cultural, social, po-
litical, and economic status quo, with all that that envisions.3 2
II.
Gorecki's inability adequately to identify or describe the
substantive ethics he believes must undergird the criminal jus-
tice system would be less important had he dealt better with
the subject he set out to discuss: the epistemology of ethics, or
30 Gorecki is similarly conclusory about detrimental effects of several other issues
on the law's educative power. See, e.g., p. 43 (punishment of drug addicts); p. 89
(Miranda requirements); p. 103 (prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining).
31 See generally sources cited note 6 supra.
32 See generally C. BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS ch. 1 (1767); A.
DICEY, LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN
ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (i905); E. DURKHEIM, THE DMSION
OF LABOUR IN SOCIETY 8o-Si, io8 (1933); E. DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOG-
ICAL METHOD 66, 67, 70 (1938); K. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS (1966); Gahringer,
Punishment and Responsibility, 66 J. PHILOSOPHY 291, 293 (1969) ("We do not really
know what we stand for until we know what in fact we will not tolerate .... [T]here
may be no community apart from the identification and punishment of crime.").
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the educative function of normative facts. 33 A good case can
be made for heightening our efforts to understand the educa-
tive aspect of the criminal law. Public education has been
neglected in the criminal justice literature in relation to its
importance. When education has been separately recognized
as a purpose of the criminal law, typically it has been merely
as an attribute of the "basic trio"' 34 of deterrence, retribution,
and reformation. 35 But rather than examine and extend the
discourse that has taken place on moral education and its
effects on compliance with laws and rules, 36 Gorecki substan-
33 It is questionable whether neutral analyses of moral language are even possible.
See, e.g., W. FRANKENA, ETHICS (x963).
34 W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES 73 (7th ed.
1967).
3S See, e.g., id. at 71-75; A. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 28, at 69-77. See also G.
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (1978); J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. I96O); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL
LAW 23-24 (1972); J. MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW (1934); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW
(2d ed. x969).
Criminal codes, too, ignore the educative function of the criminal justice system.
See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § I.o5 (McKinney 1975) ("The general purposes of the
provisions of this chapter are: . .. 5. To insure the public safety by preventing the
commission of offenses through the deterrent influence of the sentences authorized,
the rehabilitation of those convicted, and their confinement when required in the
interests of public protection."); S. i, 93d Cong., ist Sess. § 102 (1973); S. 1437, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. § IoI(b)(3) (1978); S. 1722, 96th Cong., ist Sess. § 01 (1979).
One theorist who does deal directly with the educative purpose is Hyman Gross,
although he does not reach the question of how that education occurs. See H. GROSS,
A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 400-12 (1979). See also H. OPPENHEIMER, THE
RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 293-94 (1913); 2 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 81 (1883) ("Ihe sentence of the law is to the moral
sentiment of the public in relation to any offence what a seal is to hot wax. It
converts into a permanent final judgment what might otherwise be a transient senti-
ment."); P. TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE, AND CORRECTION (I960); E. VAN DEN HAAG,
PUNISHING CRIMINALS 20-21 (1975); I WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW I (C. Torcia 14th
ed. 1978); G. WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 26 (1978); Andenaes, General
Prevention - Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 176, 179 (1952) ("In
Swedish discussion the moralizing - in other words the educational - function has
been greatly stressed. The idea is that punishment as a concrete expression of society's
disapproval of an act helps to form and strengthen the public's moral code and thereby
creates conscious and unconscious inhibitions against committing crime." (emphasis
in original)); Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401,
401, 404, 410 (1958).
36 See, e.g., Koeppes, Children and Compliance: A Cognitive Analysis of Sociali-
sation Studies, 35 LAW & Soc. REv. 545 (197o); Kohlberg, Development of Children's
Orientation Toward a Moral Order, I: Sequence in the Development of Moral Thought,
6 VITA HUMANA 1i (1963); Kohlberg, The Contributions of Developmental Psychology
to Education: Examples from Moral Education, 16 EDUC. PSYCHOLOGIST 36 (1973);
Tapp, Psychology and the Law: An Overture, 27 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 359 (1976); Tapp
& Kohlberg, Developing Senses of Law and Legal Justice, 27 J. SOC. ISSUES 65 (1971).
See generally J. PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (1932); G. VOLD,
THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY ch. I (2d ed. T. Bernard 1979) (containing citations);
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tially relies, though not always explicitly, on the sociology and
jurisprudence of Leon Petrazhitskii (pp. 27, 136, 141-42). 37
Unfortunately, Gorecki does not advance the ideas of Petra-
zhitskii, and so the examination of the educative function of
criminal law remains undeveloped.
Petrazhitskii believed that behavior is determined not so
much by legal norms as by internal mental and psychological
forces understandable by introspective psychology. 38 Along
with cognition (sensations and ideas), emotion (pleasures and
sufferings), and will (aspirations and active experiences), he
claimed to have discovered a fourth such force, "impulsions" 39
- including the "impulsions of duty" 40 - which "emerge in
response to ideas of (present, future, or just imaginary) conduct
which is being evaluated as intrinsically right or wrong."' 4 1
He emphasized the "irrational, impulsive character" 4 2 of these
psychic occurrences, or "impulsive phantasmata, ' 4 3 and en-
visioned a Darwinistic psychosocial struggle for survival
D. WRIGHT, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL BEHAVIOUR (I971); see also E. DURKHEIM,
MORAL EDUCATION (E. Wilson & H. Schnurer trans. i96i); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 453-62, 49o-96 (I97I). For a criticism of the cognitive developmental per-
spective, see, e.g., Irvine, Legal Socialisation - A Critique of a New Approach, in
PSYCHOLOGY, LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES 69 (D. Farrington, K. Hawkins &
S. Lloyd-Bostock eds. 1979). On the emotional viewpoint, see, e.g., Hogan, Moral
Conduct and Moral Character: A Psychological Perspective, 79 PSYCH. BULL. 217
(1973).
37 For bibliographical material on Petrazhitskii, including his works that have
been translated into or commented on in English, see LAW AND MORALITY: LEON
PETRAZYCKI xliii-xlvi (H. Babb trans. I955) [hereinafter cited as LAW AND MORAL-
ITY]; Babb, Petrazhitskii: Theory of Law, i8 B.U.L. REv. 511, 576-78 (1938) [here-
inafter cited as Babb II]; Babb, Petrazhitskii: Science of Legal Policy and Theory of
Law, 17 B.U.L. REv. 793 (1937) (containing citations) [hereinafter cited as Babb I];
Rudzinski, Petrazycki's Significance for Contemporary Legal and Moral Theory, 2i
AM. J. JURIS. 107, 107 n.2, io8 nn.4-6. See also N. TIMASHEFF, AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (I939); Northrop, Petrazycki's Psychological Jurispru-
dence: Its Originality and Importance, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 65I (1956); Radbruch,
Legal Philosophy, in THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES OF LASK, RADBRUCH, AND DABIN
43, 81 (K. Wilkt trans. i95o).
38 Petrazhitskii gave us a "logical-psychological intuitionist version of the psycho-
logical sociology of law." Pound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence, 5I HARv. L. REV.
777, 809 (1938).
39 See LAW AND MORALITY, supra note 37, at 23.
40 Gorecki, Leon Petrazycki, in SOCIOLOGY AND JURISPRUDENCE OF LEON PETRA-
ZYCKI 1, 5 (J. Gorecki ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as SOCIOLOGY AND JURISPRU-
DENCE].
41 Id.
42 Lande, The Sociology of Petrazycki (J. Slawikowski trans.), in SOCIOLOGY AND
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 40, at 22, 32.
43 LAW AND MORALITY, supra note 37, at 41-42, 62, 92, i58, i65, 211, 248. See
generally id. at i26, 215, 253. Timasheff referred to a phantasma as "an erroneous
projection of individual psychic phenomena into the trans-subjective world." N.
TIMASHEFF, supra note 37, at 213.
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among legal and ethical experiences, resulting in the "uncon-
scious, non-intentional character of teleology in the process of
[social] adjustment."
' 44
Although Petrazhitskii elaborated on the introspective
method, 45 he never adequately discussed either the fundamen-
tal questions of whose law and whose morality control an
actor's behavior,46 or how feelings of legal compliance origi-
nate in the mind. 47 More than forty years ago, Professor Hugh
Babb outlined the advances necessary to implement Petrazhit-
skii's theories. Among other things, he wrote, "the preparatory
work [for this science of legal policy] must include: . . . the
systematic and methodical study of the psychological forces
and laws defining the influence of law on individual and social
motivation and conduct";48 an "[i]nvestigation of the crystal-
lizations or deposits left in the human psyche (and changing
its nature) by the educative influence of law as a factor (no
less than a product) of culture" 49 - i.e., a theory of character
formation; an "[i]nvestigation of the laws in accordance with
which the successes of social pedagogy crystallize into objective
views, principles and institutions";50 and an investigation of
the possible verification of the introspective technique.51
A formidable task indeed!5 2 But Professor Gorecki has not
essayed any of this, 53 nor has he at all advanced the ideas of
his mentor. Though Gorecki claims to present a workable,
testable theory based on the educative power of the criminal
law, Petrazhitskii's and thus Gorecki's theories remain in their
conceptive stage.
44 Lande, supra note 42, at 32.
45 See, e.g., LAW AND MORALITY, supra note 37, passim. For general works on
introspection, see, e.g., C. OGDEN & I. RICHARDS, THE MEANING OF MEANING
201-03 (5th ed. 1938); G. RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 163-67 (1949).
46 See, e.g., Denzin, Interaction, Law, and Morality: The Contributions of Leon
Petrazycki, in SOCIOLOGY AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 40, at 63, 8o. See also
p. 925 supra.
47 See, e.g., Lande, supra note 42; Northrop, supra note 37, at 655-56, 662;
Rudzinski, supra note 37, at 118, 127; cf. Andenaes, supra note 35, at 197 ("No
[comprehensive] empirical study of the psychology of obedience to law has been
undertaken." (emphasis in original)).
48 Babb I, supra note 37, at 815; see pp. 926-27 supra.
49 Babb I, supra note 37, at 816.
50 Id.
"' See id. at 817-18.
52 "The specification of the scientific method by which the thesis of natural law
jurisprudence is to be implemented is the major task of contemporary legal science."
Northrop, supra note 37, at 662.
53 In fact, A Theory of Criminal Justice makes no reference at all to the Babb
articles.
[Vol. 94
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III.
Given today's wisdom, the most portentous euphemism in
the criminalist's lexicon should be "a satisfactory general theory
of crime causation." 5 4 In the words of George Bryan Vold,
"Crime must be recognized clearly as not being a single phe-
nomenon, but as consisting of many kinds of behavior occur-
ring under many different situations. No single theory there-
fore should be expected to explain the many varieties
involved." 5 5 Perhaps this accounts for the failure of the now-
languishing rehabilitation theory,5 6 which has been a part of
our zeitgeist since the late nineteenth century.5 7 Modern think-
ing has denied that the criminal justice system existed for the
purpose of punishment in the first instance.5 8  This attitude
has thwarted the maturation of criminogenic thinking. It is
now time, however, to acknowledge the presence of antinomy
and paradox, to accept the necessary eclecticism that comes
with tentative knowledge, to experiment with both the molec-
ular and the molar.5 9 "It is not to be expected that criminol-
ogical theory will develop wholly adequate explanations of
criminal behavior until human behavior in general is better
understood."' 60 Thus, Wittgenstein's reply to the question,
"Why do we punish criminals?" may be the most fair and
seasoned abstract of contemporary knowledge on crime and its
punishment:
The truth is that there is no one reason. There is the insti-
tution of punishing criminals. Different people support this
for different reasons in different cases and in different times.
Some people support it out of a desire for vengeance, some
perhaps out of a desire for justice, some out of a wish to
S4 Nearly 30 years ago, Andenaes wrote: "The time for broad slogans in crimi-
nology has passed." Andenaes, supra note 35, at 197.
ss G. VOLD, supra note 36, at 422.
56 See generally Allen, supra note 24.
s "It may be that the rehabilitative ideal was too deeply and too naively held, for
the failure to produce results has generated widespread cynicism in the United States
• .. about rehabilitation ...." G. FLETCHER, supra note 35, at 416. The British
experience has been similar. See, e.g., P. DEVLIN, THE JUDGE 31 n.i (,979).
5' See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) ("Retribution is no
longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of
offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence.").
59 See generally M. Wolfgang, Developments in Criminology in the United States
with Some Comments on the Future (1973) (unpublished manuscript on file at the
Harvard Law School Library).
60 G. VOLD, supra note 36, at 422.
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prevent a repetition of the crime, and so on. And so punish-
ments are carried out.
6 1
All of the purposes of the criminal justice system coalesce.
62
This is not a confession of resignation or cynicism; it is a
recognition of reality. 63 Whether we are dealing, for example,
with Packer's theory of the rational limits of the criminal
law, 64 with H.L.A. Hart's delicate balance between values
and policy limitations,65 with Devlin's philosophical emphasis
on the enforcement of moral values, 66 with Morris' pragmatic
attention to permissible means and potential outcomes 67 - or,
indeed, with any particular perspective in the criminological
spectrum 68 - there should be no doubt that any theory of
criminal justice that purports to be monocausal must be
viewed with circumspection. 69 As Professor Francis Allen has
recently observed, "the competition of values that characterizes
61 L. WITTGENSTEIN, LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS ON AESTHETICS, PSY-
CHOLOGY, AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF 50 (C. Barrett ed. 1966). Holmes' view is in
accord:
For the most part, the purpose of the criminal law is only to induce external
conformity to rule. All law is directed to conditions of things manifest to the
senses. And whether it brings those conditions to pass immediately by the use
of force, as when it . . . hangs a man in pursuance of a judicial sentence, or
whether it brings them about mediately through men's fears, its object is
equally an external result. In directing itself against robbery or murder, for
instance, its purpose is to put a stop to the actual physical taking and keeping
of other men's goods, or the actual poisoning, shooting, stabbing, and otherwise
putting to death of other men. If those things are not done, the law forbidding
them is equally satisfied, whatever the motive.
O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 42 (M. Howe ed. 1968). See also H. PACKER,
THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 9 (1968).
62 See, e.g., J. BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 338-39 (C. Ogden ed.
1931); W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, supra note 34, at 71-75; L. HALL & S. GLUECK,
CASES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 15 (2d ed. 1958) ("[Tihere
is hardly a penal code that can be said to have a single basic principle running
through it."); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note I5, at 2; E. SUTHERLAND, PRIN-
CIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 289 (ioth ed. D. Cressey 1955); Hart, supra note 35, at 401.
63 See generally Nielsen, Morality and Commitment, 7 IDEALISTIC STUD. 94, 104
(1977) ("moral philosophy needs its Don Quixotes, but after a session or so with the
windmills, we need the clear realistic vision of a Sancho Panza").
64 See H. PACKER, supra note 6i.
65 See H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963); H.L.A. HART, PUN-
ISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968).
66 p. DEVLIN, supra note 57.
67 N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME
CONTROL (1970).
68 See pp. gi8-ig & notes 3-8 supra.
6 9 
See, e.g., S. GLUECK & E. GLUECK, UNRAVELING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
(1950); S. GLUECK & E. GLUECK, VENTURES IN CRIMINOLOGY (1964). "[W]e need
to understand that every stance that one takes toward a complex social issue has its
own distinctive and peculiar pathologies. We ought not to think that in choosing a
stance one can avoid fundamental difficulties." Allen, supra note 24, at 155.
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an open society necessarily conditions the postulates of the
criminal law."
70
Yet Professor Gorecki argues that the criminal justice sys-
tem should be molded to the educative function exclusively,
rejecting crime control through rehabilitation and rectification
of environmental ills. These latter approaches, he complains,
are merely the result of the workings of "[aln elaborate and
influential system of antipunitive ideology . . . that makes
nonpunishment of criminals not just expedient but worthy" (p.
67). Such a fixation, which he sees as a consequence of posi-
tivist criminology, "is wrong: it undermines certainty of pun-
ishment and makes the lawbreaker, and not the general public,
the main addressee of criminal sanctions" (p. 45). Sociological
theories of crime causation 7 ' emanate from our "widespread
complex of guilt" (p. 70), and psychological theories from fal-
lacy (pp. xiv, 67, 77) and paradox (p. 75); therefore, Gorecki
would ignore them in recasting the criminal justice system.
Gorecki also rejects noneducative theories as too difficult
to implement and detrimental to the system's educative effects.
[Ilt is much easier to improve the system of criminal punish-
ments than to eliminate such assumed determinants of crime
as lack of parental love, anomie, private property, social in-
equality, racial discrimination, unemployment, or density of
population in urban areas. That is why the idea of eliminating
all these determinants instead of improving criminal justice is
not only fallacious but harmful; by influencing attitudes of
judges, prosecutors, and others who carry out the criminal
process, it undermines the educative force of criminal law and
thus contributes to the great amount of crime. (P. 73).
What is fallacious and harmful is Professor Gorecki's the-
ory. No credible scholar ever promised that eliminating or
alleviating the crime problem would be "easy." Whether the
sociological and other determinants be real or assumed, no
single causal factor - moral evaluations included - has
proven to be exclusive. Until that time occurs - if, indeed,
70 F. ALLEN, LAW, INTELLECT, AND EDUCATION III (1979). "Thus," he con-
cludes,
the case for the retention and enlargement of ethical concerns in the criminal
law is an uneasy one .... It is beset by competing considerations of great
cogency. It is limited by practical realities and by the incoherence of modern
debates on the commitments by which we are to live. In all of this the criminal
law demonstrates its kinship with the modern era.
Id. at ii8. See also Hirschi & Rudisill, The Great American Search: Causes of Crime
1876-1976, 423 ANNALS 14 (1976); p. 930 & note 62 supra.
71 One jurist has referred to these as the "rotten social background" theories of
criminology. United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 96o (D.C. Cir.) (Bazelon,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1044 (1972).
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it ever does - to declare that it is "fallacious" to eliminate,
for example, social inequality, racial discrimination, or un-
employment is itself delusive. Moreover, is the psychological
model fallacious because it is inexpedient and unworthy, or
because it addresses problems that are presently intractable?
Gorecki does realize that "effective implementation [of reha-
bilitative programs] requires prior knowledge about how each
program would operate, and the knowledge is not there" (p.
77).72 Neither, however, is it there for his approach. If he
would allow for further development of his own model, then
why not permit it for others? 73 It is simply wrong to abandon
conceivably workable plans for the control or prevention of
crime in favor of a theory of moral evaluation that is based
on such tenuous analysis.
74
IV.
The epistemic controversy continues. 75 The main risk in
criminology today is that we will abandon our highest aspi-
rations for the subject, and lower our expectations, which
themselves may prove to have been less than satisfactory. To
be sure, the task of improving the criminal justice, system is
not an easy one. It may not even be a feasible one.7 6 But if
the efforts to approach ultimate solutions, however utopian,
77
72 "Consequently, the theory [of psychologically based rehabilitation], at least in
its present shape, does not provide grounds for effective action" (p. 78) (emphasis
added). Gorecki would give new stress to "education and professional training to
improve [the offender's chances] after release" from prison (p. 129), and allow for
voluntary psychological counseling of inmates - but only to "alleviate] the pain of
being confined" (p. 129), and not to rehabilitate.
73 This problem is far from unique to Gorecki's book. See, e.g., Robbins, Book
Review, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 153, 156-57 (1977) (reviewing A. VON HIRSCH, DOING
JUSTICE (1976)).
74 "A fact or law is explained only when a sufficient knowledge of the system to
which it belongs is reached to enable one to interpret the fact or law in terms of that
system .... " D. ROBINSON, THE PRINCIPLES OF REASONING 292 (2924). See also
R. GAROFALO, CRIMINOLOGY 3 (R. Miller trans. 1914); p. 919 supra; p. 924 & note
25 supra; p. 933 & note 79 infra.
75 See generally Glaser, A Review of Crime Causation Theory and Its Application,
in I CRIME AND JUSTICE 203 (N. Morris & M. Tonry eds. 1979).
7 6 
See, e.g., i K. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 288 n.7 (3d ed.
1957):
How far should we get if, instead of introducing laws and a police force, we
approached the problem of criminality "scientifically," i.e. by trying to find out
what precisely are the causes of crime? It is as if one insisted that it is
unscientific to wear an overcoat when it is cold; and that we should rather
study the causes of cold weather and remove them.
See also E. DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 66, 67, 70 (2938).
77 See pp. xiii, 72; Gorecki, supra note 25, at 475 n.9 ("[Olne cannot definitely
rule out future success in building a general theory of all human behaviour, however
unlikely it looks today.').
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are not more painstakingly conceived and explained 78 than
Professor Gorecki's, then our criminal justice system is in a
deeper mire than even the most pessimistic theorists suppose.
The issues Gorecki raises are real and persistent. Perhaps this
is enough to require of any inquiry. In his attempt to under-
score the moralizing power of the criminal law, however, he
has taken great leaps of faith, and invariably has fallen into
the Benthamite abyss. 79 This failure may be the transdisci-
plinarian's plight. 80 But such an outlook should generate more
careful - and less careless - thinking. Without further de-
velopment, A Theory of Criminal Justice is unsubstantiated,
definitionally inadequate, superficial, conclusory, dogmatic,
and naive. The inescapable conclusion is that the serious
student of criminal etiology should forgo this book, and avoid
the misery.
78 "[lf we do not attend closely to the means [of criminal justice], the most nobly
conceived ends will be futile." L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE 1 (1977). See also
Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law, 49 YALE L.J. 987, 1026 (1940).
79
[W]hen [writers] come to speak about the means of preventing offences,.... of
perfecting morals, their imagination grows warm, their hopes are excited; one
would suppose they were about to produce the great secret, and that the human
race was going to receive a new form. It is because we have a more magnificent
idea of objects in proportion as they are less familiar, and because the imagi-
nation has a loftier flight amid vague projects which have never been subjected
to the limits of analysis.
J. BENTHAM, supra note 62, at 359. See also p. 932 & note 74 supra.
80 See pp. xiii, xiv-xv. "[Tihere is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more
doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to manage, than to introduce a new system
of things." N. MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE ch. 6 (M. Musa trans. 1964).
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